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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
strument of justice, the instant decision's extension of the theory of
derivative actions, so as to include this direct type of action, is both
reprehensible and inequitable.
EQuITY-PRoPERTY RIGHT IN AN IDEA.-Plaintiff's idea for a
radio program using talented school children was disclosed to defen-
dant with the expectation of compensation should the idea be used.
A program adopting plaintiff's idea was broadcast for over a year
and sponsored by defendant. Plaintiff seeks to recover damages for
the use of his idea. The court decided in plaintiff's favor, and held
that a protectible property right exists in an idea which is original,
novel, and reduced to concrete form, where it has been disclosed under
circumstances indicating that compensation is expected for its use.
Belt v. Hamilton National Bank, 108 F. Supp. 689 (D. D. C. 1952).
The flexible nature of the common law, and its ability to adjust
itself to the changing needs of society,' is evidenced by the gradual
weakening of its original reluctance to recognize a property right in
intangible property.2 The judicial viewpoint has undergone a meta-
morphosis since the days of the Impeachment of Lord Chief Justice
Scroggs 3 for enjoining an admittedly libellous publication because it
injured an intangible right. The once unheard of right of privacy is
now recognized by statute.4 Other intangible property rights not
covered by statute are also protected. Trade names and business
reputations are protected on the theory of unfair competition and
dilution.5 It has been held that a person has a property right in
personal letters, 6 and in the protection of his good name. 7 Trade
I See Liggett & Meyer Tobacco Co. v. Meyer, 101 Ind. App. 420, 194 N. E.
206, 210 (1935).
2 See Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442
(1902) (refusal to enjoin the printing of plaintiff's picture) ; Hodecker v.
Strickler, 39 N. Y. Supp. 515 (Sup. Ct. 1896) (refusal to enjoin unauthorized
use of plaintiff's name); Brandreth v. Lance, 8 Paige 24 (N. Y. 1839) (libel-
lous publication did not injure tangible property right); Prudential Assur.
Co. v. Knott, L. R. 10 Ch. App. 142 (1875) (refusal to enjoin a libellous
publication).
38 How. St. Tr. 197 (1680).
4 N. Y. Civ; RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51.
5 See Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Sahati, 166 F. 2d 348 (9th Cir. 1946);
Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Productions, Inc., 147 Misc. 679, 264 N. Y. Supp. 459(Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 237 App. Div. 801, 260 N. Y. Supp. 821 (1st Dep't 1932),
aff'd iner., 262 N. Y. 482, 188 N. E. 30 (1933).
6 Baker v. Libbie, 210 Mass. 599, 97 N. E. 109 (1912) (plaintiff may re-
strain the publication of personal letters); Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swans. 402, 36
Eng. Rep. 670 (1818).
7 Niver v. Niver, 200 Misc. 993, 111 N. Y. S. 2d 889 (Sup. Ct. 1951),
27 ST. JOHN'S L. Rzv. 144 (1952).
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secrets are likewise recognized and accorded protection.8
Although there exists a common-law copyright for literary prop-
erty prior to its publication,9 it is nevertheless true that there is no
property right in a mere abstract idea.10 Those ideas which are pro-
tected are described as "protectible interests," 11 and must meet cer-
tain prerequisites. The idea must be reduced to tangible form,' 2 for
it is the manner in which it is expressed rather than the idea itself
which is protected. It must be original, new, and novel.'3 However,
old ideas, transformed and expressed in a new manner, combination
or sequence through the creative genius and labor of the author,14
or incidents copied from the public domain,' 5 may successfully meet
the test of novelty. The question of the originality of an idea is one
for the jury,16 and the test of infringement is the impression received
by the average reasonable man upon reading the two works.' 7 Lastly,
the unpublished idea must be protected by a contract express or im-
plied; 18 or, in the absence of contract, there must exist a confiden-
8 See Becher v. Contoure Laboratories, Inc., 279 U. S. 388 (1929); Feasel
v. Noxall Polish Mfg. Co., 268 Fed. 887 (E. D. Pa. 1920); see Aktiebolaget
Bofors v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 131, 133 (D. D. C. 1950) (action in
tort), aff'd, 194 F. 2d 145 (D. C. Cir. 1951).
9See Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 35 Cal. 2d 653, 221
P. 2d 73, 77 (1950) ; see 35 STAT. 1076 (1909), 17 U. S. C. §2 (1946) (Copy-
right Act does not deny author of unpublished work the right to obtain dam-
ages for its use) ; Warner, Protection of the Content of Radio and Television
Programs by Common Law Copyright, 3 VAND. L. Rav. 209 (1950) ; Comment,
24 So. CALF. L. Rv. 65 (1950); Note, 104 A. L. R. 1357 (1936).0 O'Brien v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 68 F. Supp. 13 (S. D. N. Y. 1946)
(alternative holding) ; see Bowen v. Yankee Network, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 62, 63
(D. Mass. 1942) ; How J. Ryan & Associates, Inc. v. Century Brewing Ass'n,
185 Wash. 600, 55 P. 2d 1053, 1054 (1936); see Note, 23 A. L. R. 2d 244, 249
(1952).
"1See Golding v. RtK.O. Pictures, Inc., 208 P. 2d 1, 3 (1949), aff'd, 35
Cal. 2d 690, 221 P. 2d 95 (1950).
12 O'Brien v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., supra note 10; Liggett & Meyer
Tobacco Co. v. Meyer, 101 Ind. App. 420, 194 N. E. 206 (1935); Stone v.
Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 260 App. Div. 450, 23 N. Y. S. 2d 210 (Ist
Dep't 1940).
13 Lueddecke v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 70 F. 2d 345 (8th Cir. 1934) ; Masline
v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R., 95 Conn. 702, 112 Atl. 639 (1921); Larkin v.
Pennsylvania R. R., 125 Misc. 238, 210 N. Y. Supp. 374 (Sup. Ct. 1925), aff'd,
216 App. Div. 832, 215 N. Y. Supp. 875 (1st Dep't 1926), aff'd nere., 245 N. Y.
578, 157 N. E. 864 (1927).
'4 See Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 35 Cal. 2d 653, 221
P. 2d 73, 79 (1950); Golding v. R.K.O. Pictures, Inc., supra note 11, 208 P.
2d at 3; see Note, 23 A. L. R. 2d 244, 249 (1952).
15 See Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., supra note 14, 221
P. 2d at 83 (concurring opinion) ; Note, 38 CALIF. L. Rav. 332, 338 (1950).
16 See. Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., sipra note 14, 221
P. 2d at 80.
17 Id., 221 P. 2d at 78.
18 Bowen v. Yankee Network, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 62 (D. Mass. 1942);
Haskins v. Ryan, 75 N. J. Eq. 330, 78 Ati. 566 (1908); Bristol v. Equitable
Life Assur. Soc'y, 132 N. Y. 264, 30 N . E. 506 (1892).
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tial relationship.19 Judicial protection has been denied on the ground
that a voluntary disclosure of the idea causes it to become common
property. 20 This does not mean that there may not be a limited dis-
closure 21 so as to apprise the purchaser of what is being offered to
him. "If it were held otherwise the mere offer to sell would destroy
the thing offered." 22
The present case is decided in a manner which the court thinks
more in accord with modern legal developments and substantial jus-
tice. A novel idea, tangible in form and disclosed under express or
implied contract, is a legally protected property right.
It is submitted on the one hand, that a truly ingenious idea, so
difficult to create, warrants a higher claim to be treated as property
than mere physical possessions. Failure to protect these ideas would
result in a removal of the profit motive, which is their impetus, and
consequently the free flow of progressive ideas to the general public
would be retarded. On the other hand, the apparent willingness of
the courts to protect these ideas and their tremendous commercial
value, especially in the field of radio, television and motion pictures,
has brought an avalanche of claimants asserting that they are orig-
inators of ideas which have been unscrupulously appropriated. Thus
the likelihood of nuisance suits is evident. Any attempt to resolve
this apparent conflict must undertake to reconcile the need for ade-
quate legal protection to men of ability with the necessity for dis-
couraging arbitrary and vexatious suits based on unfounded claims
to originality.
INSURANCE-PURcHASER's RIGHTS TO PROCEEDS OF VENDOR'S
PoLIc.-Plaintiff-purchaser brought an action for specific perfor-
mance of a contract for sale of real property and to recover a portion
19 See Shubert v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 Misc. 734, 741, 72 N. Y. S.
2d 851, 857 (Sup. Ct. 1947), aff'd mem., 274 App. Div. 751, 80 N. Y. S. 2d
724 (1st Dep't 1948) ; see Note, 23 A. L. R. 2d 244, 254 (1952).20 See Moore v. Ford Motor Co., 43 F. 2d 685, 686 (2d Cir. 1930) ; Bowen
v. Yankee Network, Inc., supra note 18, at 63; Bristol v. Equitable Life Assur.
Soc'y, supra note 18, at 267, 30 N. E. at 507 (1892).
21 See Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 35 Cal. 2d 653, 221
P. 2d 73, 80 (1950) (recording audition for a radio program does not make
the idea public property); How J. Ryan & Associates, Inc. v. Century Brew-
ing Ass'n, 185 Wash. 600, 55 P. 2d 1053, 1054 (1936). For further examples
of limited disclosures, see Warner, Protection of the Content of Radio and
Television Programs by Common Law Copyright, 3 VAND. L. Rtv. 209, 229
(1950).
22 How J. Ryan & Associates, Inc. v. Century Brewing Ass'n, supra note
21, 55 P. 2d at 1054.
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